Georgia State University

ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
ECON Publications

Department of Economics

2008

The Property Tax in Developing Countries: Current Practice and
Prospects
Roy W. Bahl
Georgia State University, rbahl@gsu.edu

Jorge Martinez Vazquez
Georgia State University, jorgemartinez@gsu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_facpub
Part of the Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Bahl, Roy, and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez. 2008. “The Property Tax in Developing Countries: Current Practice
and Prospects.” In Toward a Vision of Land in 2015: International Perspectives, 23–46. Lincoln Institute of
Land Policy.

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Economics at ScholarWorks @
Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in ECON Publications by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.

35476_U01.qxd 2/5/08 3:37 PM Page 23

2
The Property Tax in
Developing Countries:
Current Practice and Prospects
Roy Bahl and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez

O

ver the past two decades there has been an unprecedented move toward decentralized governance all over the world. The changes have
taken on special signiﬁcance in many developing and transitional countries where centralized systems were perceived to have failed to deliver improved
general welfare. The promise of political, administrative, and ﬁscal decentralization is that it can strengthen democratic representative institutions,
increase the overall efﬁciency of the public sector, and lead to improved social and economic welfare for countries that decide to adopt it. One critical
assumption behind those expectations is that decentralized governments
will generally be more accountable and responsive to citizens’ needs and
preferences. At the same time, there is general agreement among experts in
decentralization that increased accountability can be ensured only when subnational governments have an adequate level of autonomy and discretion in
raising their own revenues.
Thus, if effective ﬁscal decentralization requires meaningful revenue autonomy at the regional and local levels of government, the question is which
taxes should be allocated at those levels. This is known in the ﬁscal decentralization literature as the “tax assignment problem” (see Martinez-Vazquez,
McLure, and Vaillancourt 2006). Although there is some variation in the
type of taxes recommended as desirable for providing subnational governments with revenue autonomy, virtually every student of intergovernmental
ﬁnance and a myriad of reports on ﬁscal decentralization design have identiﬁed the property tax as one of the best candidates for a mainstay at the subnational level, especially for local governments.
23
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TABLE 2.1

Property Tax Revenues as a Percent of GDP

OECD countries
(number of countries)

Developing countries
(number of countries)

Transitional countries
(number of countries)

All countries
(number of countries)

1970s

1980s

1990s

2000s

1.24

1.31

1.44

2.12

16

18

16

18

0.42

0.36

0.42

0.60

20

27

23

29

0.34

0.59

0.54

0.68

1

4

20

18

0.77

0.73

0.75

1.04

37

49

59

65

Note: The data for 2000s are for the years 2000 and 2001.
Source: International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, various years.

Something else makes the property tax peculiar in the revenue assignment problem. Almost without exception, revenues from the property tax
are assigned to local governments. The degree of discretion given to local
governments to manipulate the tax may vary, but the thinking that it belongs
to local governments seems well entrenched. That is not generally the case
with other taxes that ﬁscal decentralization experts recommend be assigned
to subnational governments—for example, motor vehicle taxes or piggyback
personal income taxes.
Despite what seems to be a generally accepted argument that the property
tax is local, subnational governments in developing and transitional countries make relatively little use of it. On average, the property tax revenues they
raise are equivalent to only about 0.6 percent of GDP (see table 2.1).
This is a big puzzle and, in one way or another, the main subject of all the
chapters in this book. There are many potential explanations of why the
property tax is not used more intensively as a source of ﬁnancing public services in developing and transitional countries. Not the least of these is the fact
that it is a “difﬁcult” tax, which from a rather cynical viewpoint may explain
the apparent willingness or “generosity” of central authorities to hand it over
to subnational governments. Rather than offering a general explanation, the
more modest goal of this chapter is to examine the current practice in developing and transitional countries and identify some of the factors behind the
light demand for this tax.
–1___
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ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES

As noted, there is a general presumption that the property tax is an ideal tax
at the subnational government level in decentralized systems. We might challenge that view by listing the advantages and disadvantages associated with
that choice.

Advantages
The a priori case for heavier use of the property tax at the subnational level in
developing and transitional countries is a strong one. There is much to recommend a greater reliance on this revenue source.
Revenue Potential and Stability. First, and most important, the property tax
is potentially a signiﬁcant revenue producer for subnational governments. In
the case of Canada and the United States, property tax revenues reach between 3 and 4 percent of GDP. The value of land and improvements constitutes a broad base that is growing in virtually all countries at a fast rate, and
even a modest statutory tax rate can yield signiﬁcant amounts of revenue.1
However, the realization of large amounts of revenue requires a willingness to
impose the property tax at higher levels than now exist in most developing
countries, plus a good valuation system and a high rate of compliance (which
implies a strong program of enforcement). As we discuss below, industrialized countries have realized this revenue potential to a much greater extent
than developing and transitional countries have, not only because of their
valuation and enforcement systems, but also because of the extent to which
they have embraced ﬁscal decentralization.
Another positive feature of property taxation, and one that makes it especially attractive for subnational governments, is the relative stability of its tax
base. Fluctuations in the business cycle tend to have a much bigger impact
on tax bases such as earned wage income and proﬁts or even sales. However,
the relatively greater stability of market values is of little consequence if they
are not accurately reﬂected in assessed property values. As we discuss below,
the valuation of property is one of the key problems with effective use of the
property tax in developing and transitional countries.
1

For example, Hernando de Soto (2000) estimates that the total value of Africans’ informally
owned houses and farmland in 1997 was roughly $1 trillion, or nearly three times sub-Saharan
Africa’s annual GDP. However, much of the tax base in developing countries is subject to informal property rights, which does not help with the willingness to pay taxes. As reported in The
Economist (January 15, 2004), “In Africa . . . less than 10% of the continent’s land is formally
owned, and barely one African in ten lives in a house with title deeds.”
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Fairness and Equity. The property tax might be seen as a rough kind of beneﬁt charge, and therefore not only as an efﬁcient tax, but also as a fair tax.
Businesses and some residential owners may perceive that they beneﬁt from
certain public investments approximately in proportion to the value of their
properties. For example, property values may be higher, ceteris paribus, in areas where street lighting is functional, policing is better, schools are of higher
quality, and so on. It follows that there is a sense in which property taxes
roughly correspond to beneﬁts received. That, of course, assumes that property is correctly valued to reﬂect the betterment associated with public investments and regularly provided public services, that valuations are regularly
updated, that land markets function, and that beneﬁting properties are not
routinely exempted through the political process. It also assumes that property owners and taxpayers believe that the link between tax base and beneﬁts
received is more or less accurate.
The property tax might also be seen as vertically equitable in developing
and transitional countries. In fact, it can be progressive in developing countries and, therefore, can increase the overall vertical equity of the tax system
(Bahl and Linn 1992; Bahl 1998; Sennoga, Sjoquist, and Wallace 2008).
There are several reasons for this. Property ownership is heavily concentrated
among the wealthy in developing countries, and landlords are often not
reached by the income tax system. The property tax has the potential of ﬁlling the gap. On the basis of the high level of concentration of ownership, a
tax on the land value base would seem to be the most progressive. At the
other end of the income distribution spectrum, public housing and lowvalued properties are generally not taxed at all, which also adds to the progressivity of the tax.
However, property taxes in less developed countries (LDCs) can be made
regressive by exemption policies that target the well-to-do, such as policies
that exempt owner-occupied properties, as practiced in some countries. Preferential assessment (or exemption) of certain commercial or industrial properties may have the same effect. The distributional effects of the property tax,
then, are heavily inﬂuenced by the rate and base structure of the tax, as well
as its administration. These are factors that government can control to some
extent.

–1___
0___
+1___

Tax Exporting. The property tax has the desirable feature that much of the
tax burden is likely borne by residents in the jurisdiction where the services
ﬁnanced by property taxes are provided (i.e., there is a “correspondence” between the location in which the tax burdens are borne and the location in
which the expenditure beneﬁts are enjoyed). In such cases, the local governments that levy the tax are more likely to be ﬁscally responsible, that is, less
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likely to overspend on the expectation that tax exporting would allow them to
pass some of the burden to residents of other jurisdictions.
The reality of the “correspondence” advantage of the property tax might
be challenged. To the extent that the property tax is concentrated on nonresidential property, and improvements (versus land) are a signiﬁcant component of the tax base, there is a greater potential for exporting the burden to
other regions. This occurs, for example, when businesses sell outside the region and are able to pass their taxes on to consumers and when landlords are
absentee owners. In countries where only industrial-commercial properties
are taxed, the potential for exporting the property tax burden is greater, and
the property tax is a less suitable local government levy.
Compliance Costs. The property tax has the advantage of imposing a relatively low compliance cost on taxpayers because taxpayer intervention in the
determination of tax liability is minimal, except in the case of appeals. Most
taxes are self-assessed (e.g., corporate income taxes or value-added tax), but
liability to pay property taxes is determined by the tax authorities; therefore,
the compliance costs are largely shifted to the government.2 Even in cases
where there has been a move to self-assessment, the argument is that compliance costs have been reduced because contact with possibly corrupt administrative and certainly bothersome administrative staff was removed. The
other potential compliance cost has to do with the method of making payment, but in recent years countries have increasingly shifted to using banks as
collection points (Kelly 2004).
Tax Base Competition. A major advantage of the property tax as a local levy
is that it usually poses no signiﬁcant problem of competition with the central
government. The value of land and improvements is not a tax base central
governments covet; hence, they often seem content to leave it to local governments.3 As we mentioned previously, the reasons for this common behavior among central authorities are far from clear. Although central authorities
may see the wisdom of assigning this tax to local governments, given the advantages discussed in this section, it could also be that their lack of interest in
the property tax lies in its complexity and low revenue potential. Or it could
reﬂect the calculus of central ofﬁcials regarding revenue potential versus political cost.
2

In most developing and transitional countries, property taxes are assessed by a central authority but billed and collected by local authorities.
3
This is not always the case. For example, in China, Indonesia, and Jamaica, the property tax is
a central government levy, even though local governments receive most of the revenue.
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The lack of vertical tax base competition does not exclude, of course, the
possibility of horizontal or interjurisdictional tax rate or base competition.
Without getting into the positive and negative aspects of that type of competition, the advantage of the property tax over other potential local taxes is that
interjurisdictional competition is likely to lead to fewer economic distortions
and smaller excess burden losses.
Land-Use Efficiency. Finally, a property tax might be thought of as a charge
for land that can lead to signiﬁcant improvements in the quality of land use.
Particularly if land is taxed according to its location value in urban areas, and
if assessment is at its highest and best use, a more rational allocation of land
use will occur. Here the land-value version of property taxation has a particular advantage. In developing countries, however, the effective rate of taxation
is so low that such incentives might not be effective.

Disadvantages
There are major drawbacks to the use of property taxes in developing and
transitional countries. Administrative constraints and the perception of the
tax by taxpayers go a long way toward explaining the relatively low revenue
dependence on this tax.
Administration Cost. The major problem with the property tax is that it is
generally difﬁcult and costly to administer. Less efﬁcient and more costly administration, in combination with low revenue yields, can make the property tax a losing proposition in terms of revenue yield per dollar of
administrative cost. In most developing and transitional countries, property
taxes are badly administered by any standard. As we discuss in a later section
of this chapter, both assessment ratios and collection rates often are very low,
which leads to unfair treatment of various categories of taxpayers and to signiﬁcant revenue leakage. Property taxes are not—cannot—be self assessed;
hence, a high staff cost is implied, and a great deal of record keeping is required. There also are signiﬁcant administrative costs associated with collections and appeals. Compounding the problem, there is a shortage of property
assessors in virtually all developing countries. Thus, even in the best of circumstances the property tax can seem a poor ﬁnancing choice for local
governments.

–1___
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Enforcement. The property tax is difﬁcult to enforce. Elected local ofﬁcials
are often not in a position to take actions against delinquent taxpayers, because they are not provided with the means to do so and often those who are
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not in compliance are leaders in the community. Potentially effective
solutions—penalizing those who are out of compliance by such means as
conﬁscation of property, for example—may be considered too extreme and
generally are not feasible because of the political fallout. The special attachment to land in many developing countries raises the possibility that broadbased acceptance of a more intensively used property tax is not likely. This
problem has strong similarities to that of collecting user charges for services
considered to be essential to life (e.g., housing, water, electricity). Ultimately,
it becomes an issue of political will, and few developing and transitional
countries have been able to exercise that will. There are some exceptions. For
example, South African local authorities have had mixed success with using
the threat of cutting off electricity for failure to pay a property tax or utility
bill.
Taxpayer Attitudes. A third disadvantage is that the property tax is terribly
unpopular with voters, and as a result, politicians are loathe to rely heavily on
it. Per dollar of revenue raised, property taxes may generate more negative reaction than any other levy. There are several reasons for this degree of unpopularity. One is that the tax is levied on (unrealized) accretions to the
wealth of an individual or a business, and those accretions do not necessarily
correspond to income received. Even without increases in value, the property
tax is essentially a tax on the potential income from some form of property
(real estate) via the opportunity to rent or the value of using one’s own home.
Other forms of property—for example, stocks or other ﬁnancial taxes—are
taxed only upon realization. That difference creates not only special implementation problems (for example, how to treat those living on ﬁxed incomes), but also a general hostility toward the tax. The unpopularity of the
property tax is also a by-product of the judgmental approach to assessment
that is taken almost everywhere. A proposed increase in the tax rate on a tax
base that is determined in uncertain or even mysterious ways is bound to provoke negative reactions. Finally, the tax is unpopular in part because it is so
visible. Most income tax payers are subject to withholding, but even so, may
not be able to accurately report their annual payment. Consumption taxes
are paid in small increments and are often obscured in the ﬁnal price of the
merchandise. Most people could not even estimate the annual amount of
value-added tax they pay. The property tax, on the other hand, is usually
billed annually or quarterly, and property owners are much more likely to
know exactly what they pay.
Elasticity. Government ofﬁcials desire a tax that exhibits automatic revenue
growth. This protects them from having to return to the voters for permission
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to increase the tax rate every time the demand for or cost of public services increases. The property tax is not an income-elastic tax. The basic problem is
that reassessments occur only periodically; hence, year-to-year growth in revenues is mostly due to additions to the tax base through construction. When
revaluation is too infrequent, say every ﬁve or ten years, it leads to large onetime increases in tax liability and to voter uproar from the shock. Countries
use various means to cushion the shock, but those means often end up reducing the effective rate of property tax. Some innovations introduced internationally to deal with the low elasticity include indexation—for example,
used in Jordan, Colombia, and Brazil—or the phasing-in of the reassessed
values, as in the Philippines (Guevara 2004).4

AN OVERVIEW OF REVENUE PERFORMANCE

Despite the a priori potential of property taxes, they are far from being a
mainstay of the revenue system in developing and transitional countries.
Nevertheless, the property tax can be revenue productive in, and often contribute signiﬁcantly to the ﬁnancing of, subnational governments in many
countries. On average, as shown in table 2.1, property taxes in developing
and transitional countries raise less relative to GDP than in OECD countries. In the early 2000s property taxes in OECD countries represented 2.12
percent of GDP, while for developing countries the ﬁgure was 0.6 percent
and for transitional countries, 0.68 percent. It is interesting that the trend for
all three categories of countries has been slightly upward since the 1970s.
The data in table 2.1 strongly suggest that reliance on the property tax comes
with economic development (e.g., compare OECD countries with developing countries). Some OECD countries make especially heavy use of the
property tax. For example, Canada raises a revenue amount equivalent to
about 4 percent of GDP, and the United States raises nearly 3 percent of
GDP. The variation among countries in the intensity of use of the property
tax is explored below in a more systematic way.
The ﬁgures presented in table 2.2 for the percent of total subnational
expenditures ﬁnanced by property taxes are particularly interesting. Developing countries may not use the property tax more intensely than OECD
countries do, but they appear to rely more heavily on the property tax to ﬁnance
subnational government expenditures. This gives a different perspective
4
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Indexation of the property tax refers to the practice of mandating an annual increase in taxes
equal to some agreed-upon price index, such as the consumer price index.
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TABLE 2.2 Property Tax Revenues as a Percent of Total Subnational
Government Expenditures
1970s

1980s

1990s

2000s

OECD countries

9.7

9.88

13.65

12.40

(number of countries)

16

17

16

19

18.65

15.97

13.49

18.37

21

27

24

20

3.67

4.92

7.75

9.43

1

4

18

20

14.49

12.89

11.63

13.40

38

48

58

59

Developing countries
(number of countries)

Transitional countries
(number of countries)

All countries
(number of countries)

Note: The data for 2000s are for the five years from 2000 to 2004.
Source: Columns 2 and 3 are based on International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics
Yearbook (GFS), 2002; columns 4 and 5 have been calculated from GFS.

about the importance of strengthening the practice of property taxation
in developing countries. Of course, the ﬁnancing of about 18 percent of
subnational government spending from the property tax in developing
countries is also a reﬂection of relatively lower subnational government
expenditures and generally fewer options for local taxes. For example, income taxes are much more common at the subnational level in OECD
countries.
The average ﬁgures in tables 2.1 and 2.2 hide considerable levels of variation in the use of property taxes within each of the three categories of countries represented.5 What we want to ask next is, besides the level of economic
development, what other external institutional factors may help explain variations in the use of property taxes?

FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND THE PROPERTY TAX

Although many factors affect the use of property taxes, a useful approach
to explaining the relative demand for property taxation in a country is to
5

See Bird and Slack (2004) and Malme and Youngman (2001) for descriptions of individual
country property taxes.
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view it as derived from the national electorate’s demand for ﬁscal decentralization. A reasonable working hypothesis is that countries that seek
greater ﬁscal decentralization will rely more heavily on property taxation.
To be truly effective, ﬁscal decentralization requires autonomous subnational government taxes, and property taxes are a logical choice. Consider
the following:
• A good local tax features a correspondence between the boundaries within

which the expenditure beneﬁts are received, and the boundaries within which
the tax burden falls. The property tax comes close to satisfying that condition
for both second- and third-tier governments.
• Under a good administration, with a commitment to provide important services, the property tax can be a signiﬁcant source of revenue for subnational
governments. With an efﬁcient administration and with commitment to enforcement, the property tax base can be large and income elastic.
• Subnational governments, particularly third-tier local governments, may
have a comparative advantage in assessing the property tax base because of
their familiarity with the local economy and its land-use patterns.
• Higher-level governments are not likely to aggressively compete for the right
to levy property taxes, because it is a high-cost method of raising revenue, it
is politically unpopular, and central governments do not have a comparative
advantage in assessing the base.

–1___
0___
+1___

In this section, with the help of a multicountry panel data set drawn
from the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and from several other sources, we test the hypothesis that
ﬁscal decentralization drives the intensity of property tax use. We measure
ﬁscal decentralization as subnational government expenditures as a percent
of total government expenditures. In order to test the role of ﬁscal decentralization on the relative use of property taxation, we need to control for
other variables that are expected to affect the dependent variable. In particular, we expect that reliance on property taxation may be higher across
countries and over time the greater the degree of urbanization. Both land
values and improvement values tend to increase signiﬁcantly in urban centers, and with that, property taxation becomes more attractive. Besides degree of urbanization, in the regression analysis we control for GDP per
capita, because we have seen that for a variety of institutional reasons
richer countries tend to make higher use of property taxation. Transitional
countries are identiﬁed by a dummy variable; even controlling for differences in income per capita, transitional countries present distinct institutional peculiarities, such as titling and history of land ownership, that may
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TABLE 2.3 Determinants of the Relative Use of Property Taxation: OLS
Estimation (Dependent variable: property tax revenues to GDP)
Coefficient estimate

T-stat

Probability > t

Constant

−2.012

−3.80

0.000

lgdpcap

0.322

5.11

0.000

−0.069

−1.85

0.068

decent

1.496

3.25

0.002

urbanpct

0.855

1.77

0.080

Variables

lpop

pgr

24.43

3.32

0.001

transition

−0.102

−0.48

0.630

dy90

−0.132

−0.70

0.485

dy95

−0.223

−1.27

0.208

Number of observations

107

F (8,98)

13.09

R-squared

0.5166

Adjusted R-squared

0.4772

Root Mean Square Error

0.7005

Notes on variables: lgdpcap = logarithm of GDP per capita; lpop = logarithm of population amount;
decent = decentralization, measured as subnational revenue as a percent of national revenue;
urbanpct = percent of urban population to total population; pgr = average of population growth rate;
transition = dummy of countries in transition; dy90 = dummy of year 1990; dy95 = dummy of year 1995.
Source: Authors’ own calculations.

affect the relative use of property taxation. We also control for population
size and the rate of population growth.
The estimation is based on a panel of 70 countries for three years, 1990,
1995, and 2000. Although data for many of the variables are available on an
annual basis, the restriction to three years is imposed by the data availability
for the urban population ratio. Besides the GFS, we use data from the World
Resources Institute (www.wri.org) for GDP per capita, population, and population growth rate. The data for urbanization are from the United Nations
Secretariat (2004).
Before we discuss the regression results, we need to address several econometric issues. Because of the possible nonlinear effects of population and
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TABLE 2.4 Determinants of the Relative Use of Property Taxation: TSLS
Estimation (Dependent variable: property tax revenues to GDP)
Variables

Coefficient estimate

T-stat

Probability > t

Constant

−6.487

−4.47

0.007

lgdpcap

0.362

5.87

0.000

lpop

−0.042

−1.16

0.864

decent

12.766

3.00

0.013

1.226

2.52

0.014

78.942

3.78

0.589

0.015

0.07

0.754

dy90

−0.2329

−1.25

0.707

dy95

−0.3109

−1.76

0.157

urbanpct
pgr
transition

Number of observations
F (8,98)

107
12.72

R-squared

0.5093

Adjusted R-squared

0.4693

Root Mean Square Error

0.7058

Notes on variables: lgdpcap = logarithm of GDP per capita; lpop = logarithm of population amount;
decent = decentralization, measured as subnational revenue as a percent of national revenue;
urbanpct = percent of urban population to total population; pgr = average of population growth rate;
transition = dummy of countries in transition; dy90 = dummy of year 1990; dy95 = dummy of year 1995.
Source: Authors’ own calculations.

–1___
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GDP per capita, those two variables are entered in the regression in logarithms. Given the cross-country nature of the data set, there were potentially
issues speciﬁc to each of the countries for which we could not control that
might have an impact on the behavior of the dependent variable (property
taxes relative to GDP). That might seem to indicate that the appropriate approach was ﬁxed or random effects estimation. However, because we were restricted to three years and because of missing data for some of the variables,
we had an unbalanced panel data set with 107 observations, which did not
support a ﬁxed effects estimation approach for 70 different countries. Instead,
we used ordinary regression and allowed for time effects by using dummy
variables for 1990 and 1995.
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In table 2.3 we present the ordinary least squares (OLS) results and in
table 2.4 two-stage least squares (TSLS) results. The need for TSLS arises
from the potential endogeneity of the main control variable of interest, the
level of ﬁscal decentralization. It may be not only that decentralization affects the relative use of property taxation, as hypothesized, but also, in a reverse causation, that the presence or relative ease of property taxation affects
the extent of decentralization. In fact, the Hausman test for endogeneity
shows that we could not reject the possibility that the decentralization variable was indeed endogenous. For that reason we ran TSLS as an alternative
and in the ﬁrst stage used as instruments for decentralization a dummy variable denoting whether the country is an ex-British colony,6 and population
growth rates.
Results from both the OLS and TSLS estimations show that the coefﬁcient for ﬁscal decentralization is positive and statistically signiﬁcant,
being much larger in the second case. This fundamentally supports the
hypothesis that demand for the use of property taxation derives in part
from the level of decentralization. The degree of urbanization, as expected, takes a positive and statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient in the TSLS
estimation. The log of per capita income is positive and highly signiﬁcant
in both equations. The dummy year variables and the dummy for transitional countries are not statistically signiﬁcant, while the log of population
is negative and signiﬁcant and the population growth rate is positive and
signiﬁcant.
We may use these ﬁndings to help explain the slow growth of the property
tax in developing countries, as reported in table 2.1. As we show in table 2.5,
there has been little growth in the ﬁscal decentralization ratio for three decades. For developing countries, the level of ﬁscal decentralization, measured
by subnational government expenditures as a share of total government expenditure, was about 13 percent, on average, in the 1970s, and was marginally lower in the 1990s and 2000s. Based on the estimated coefﬁcient for
decentralization in table 2.4, we can say that, other things being equal, if the
decentralization ratio had increased by 5 percent for developing countries in
the 1990s, the ratio of property tax revenue to GDP in that decade would, on
average, have been close to 0.6, or the average level reached in the 2000s by
that group of countries.

6

This includes Canada and the United States. This variable may not be the ideal instrument because it may be correlated with the errors in the OLS regression, but ﬁnding a good alternative
instrument for decentralization is a notoriously difﬁcult problem for the entire ﬁscal decentralization literature.
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1970s

Subnational government
tax as a share of total

1980s

1990s–2000s

Developing

OECD

Developing

OECD

Developing

OECD

Transitional

countries

countries

countries

countries

countries

countries

countries

10.68

17.91

8.87

18.18

10.61

18.39

22.41

(43)

(24)

(33)

(23)

(28)

(21)

(23)

13.42

33.68

12.09

31.97

12.97

32.68

30.32

(45)

(23)

(41)

(24)

(54)

(24)

(24)

government tax
Subnational government
expenditure as a share of
total government
expenditure
Note: Sample sizes are in parentheses.
Source: International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, various years.
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TABLE 2.5 Fiscal Decentralization Indicators (Percent)
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TABLE 2.6 Ratio of Third-Tier Government Expenditures to Total Subnational
Government Expenditures, Selected Countries (Percent)

OECD countries
(number of countries)
Developing countries
(number of countries)
All countries
(number of countries)

1990s

2000s

53.91

46.89

10

10

40.97

40.63

8

8

47.44

29.17

18

18

Notes: The table excludes countries with 100 percent of subnational expenditures at the local level (that is,
those countries without intermediate regional or provincial governments). The data for 2000s are for the
five years from 2000 to 2004.
Source: International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, various years.

With an adjusted R-square of 0.47 for the regression in table 2.4, we
are far from explaining satisfactorily what goes in to determining the intensity of property tax use. The lack of consistent data is a major difﬁculty.
For example, the arguments for property taxation are that it is the most
suitable tax for third-tier local governments—that is, city and municipal governments that are small enough to have the advantage of familiarity in setting tax rates that reﬂect voter preferences for ﬁnancing local
services and in assessing property. Thus, a reasonable additional hypothesis
would be that the greater the importance of local governments in the subnational government sector (local plus regional), the higher the intensity of
property tax use.7 Unfortunately, because the GFS does not consistently
show that breakdown, we cannot introduce that type of variable in the regressions in tables 2.3 and 2.4. In table 2.6 we use available data to describe the importance of third-tier governments in ﬁscal decentralization
in recent years. One can intuit from table 2.6 that even if the additional hypothesis were correct, little change in the intensity of use of the property
tax should have been expected because, if anything, the relative importance of local governments in the subnational sector has slightly decreased
in recent years.

7

A corollary of this reasoning is that other taxes, such as personal income and consumption
taxes, are more easily applicable at the regional level, so that the greater the importance of
intermediate-level governments in the subnational government sector, the lower the relative use
of property taxation vis-à-vis other taxes.
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HOW TO STRENGTHEN REVENUE PERFORMANCE

As shown in table 2.1, the property tax share of GDP has not increased signiﬁcantly over the past 30 years. In the previous section of this chapter we
identiﬁed several “external” institutional reasons for that, such as the lack
of an increase in ﬁscal decentralization. There are other, “internal” institutional reasons—having to do with how property taxes are structured and
administered—that no doubt contribute to the overall lackluster performance
of property taxation. Those factors are especially relevant in the developing
world. Data are not available for us to analyze those internal determinants of
revenue growth on a country-by-country basis. However, we might use a priori
reasoning to speculate on what has gone wrong and then try to illustrate those
conjectures with examples and information from selected countries.
The following identity describes the components or steps that go into identifying the ratio of property tax revenues to GDP in any particular country.
T T
AV TMV MV
Tc
= c L
y
y
TL AV TMV MV

where
Tc

=

Property Tax Revenue Collections

y
TL
AV
TMV
MV

=
=
=
=
=

GDP
Property Tax Liability
Taxable Assessed Value
Taxable Market Value
Full Market Value

The term on the left of the identity is the ratio of property tax revenue
collections to GDP. It is the wide variation in this ratio (reported in table
2.1) that we would like to explain. Why do some countries realize a much
higher effective property tax rate than others? Our focus here is on the components of the tax structure and its implementation, particularly assessment
and collection.
The ﬁrst term on the right is the collection ratio—that is, the percent of
true liability that is collected. In developing countries, where enforcement is
often lax, collection rates as low as 50 percent are not unusual. The examples
presented in table 2.7 support this point.8 Even the low collection rates re8
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There are numerous other examples of low collection rates. For example, Iregui, Melo, and
Ramos (2004) report effective collection rates of 80 percent for a large sample of Colombian
municipalities in the 1999–2002 period; Kim (1993) reports a collection efﬁciency in Indonesia of 65 percent.
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TABLE 2.7 Selected Measures of Property Tax Administration

Country

Assessment
ratio

Collection rate

Selected
exemptions
(partial or total)

Philippines
(Rosengard 1998;
Guevara 2004)

50–60 percent
of current billings
in 1990

Legal assessment
ratios vary from
15 percent to
80 percent

Assessment ratios
vary by value class
and by property use

Jamaica
(Sjoquist 2004)

40 percent
in 2004

The median
assessment ratio
was 11 percent
between the
general
revaluations

Certain agricultural
properties

Chile
(Rosengard 1998)

73 percent
in 1990

—

Two-thirds of all
property is exempt

Indonesia
(Rosengard 1998)

80 percent
in 1990

Legal assessment
rates of 20 percent

—

Kenya
(Kelly 2004)

10–60 percent

Actual rates vary
between 20 percent
and 70 percent

—

Colombia
(Iregui et. al. 2004;
Bird 2004)

80 percent

70 percent in
Bogota, 85 percent
in Medillin

—

Source: Various works cited in the table.

ported in the table may be overestimates, because in some cases they include
collections of arrears in the numerator and only current-year liabilities in the
denominator.
The second term, the ratio of tax liability to assessed value, describes the
tax rate. The higher the legal tax rates, the higher the value of this term. Governments in all countries face great pressure to keep the nominal rates low,
because of the unpopularity of the property tax. A typical range for tax rates
may be between 0.5 percent and 1.0 percent for countries using a capital
value system.
The third term is the ratio of assessed value to taxable market value.
This describes the efﬁciency of the valuation process and also discretionary
decisions to reduce the base offered by the taxable market value by applying an assessment ratio that is less than 1.0. If no discretionary assessment
ratios were applied, and all properties on the roll were valued at 100 percent of full market value, this ratio would be 1.0. In practice, valuation
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rates can be as low as 20 percent. As mentioned, assessed values are sometimes low because legally they are set at something less than full market
value. The overwhelming evidence from developing countries is that properties are dramatically under assessed. Some evidence on assessment ratios
is given in table 2.7.
The ratio of taxable market value to total market value gives an indication of the impact of exemptions and preferential treatments on the property
tax base. In many countries, sizable exemptions have been provided, depleting the tax base. The exemptions range from preferential treatment for
homeowners to property tax holidays for new businesses. Another important
reason the taxable market value may be much lower than full market value
is that many properties are not valued at all. Again, some evidence is presented in table 2.7. For example, in the case of Chile, two-thirds of all property is reported to be exempt. Another cause for the divergence between
taxable market value and total market value is the failure to incorporate new
construction in the tax rolls.
Finally, the ratio of market value of real property to GDP tells us how
property values compare to total output in the economy. For example, in an
urbanized country, one might expect a higher (and growing) ratio of market
value of property to total GDP. Local governments can exert little control
over this component of revenue performance. We have no evidence on this
last term and treat it simply as a residual to complete the identity.
In sum, what this identity tells us is that administrative and policy reasons for the poor revenue performance of the property tax in developing
countries are numerous, but are largely within the control of the local governments.
The importance of this point can easily be illustrated by running a simple
simulation to identify the potential revenue impacts of local government administrative reform, as shown in table 2.8. In the columns of the table we
show the components of the property tax identity presented above—for example, column 1 shows the ratio of property tax to GDP; column 2 shows the
collection rate. The ﬁrst row of the table shows the baseline simulation,
where the values of all the parameters are reasonably chosen so that the resulting property tax effort is 0.6 percent of GDP, the international average for
developing countries, as we saw in table 2.1. The parameters of concern are
the collection rate, the assessment ratio, and the exemption policy, and for
those we have chosen values that seem more or less reﬂective of the actual
practice. A statutory tax rate of about 0.5 percent seems a reasonable assumption, though we will not vary this component of the simulation. The ratio of
market value to GDP (which may hold many other factors) is calculated as a
residual to satisfy the identity.
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TABLE 2.8 Simulated Impacts of Alternative
Property Tax Administration Reform
Simulation

T
AV
TMV
––
—— –MV
—–
—
(T ) (TT ) ( AV
) (–——
TMV ) ( AV ) ( y )
C
—
y

C
—
L

L
-—

Baseline

0.6

0.5

0.05

0.5

0.8

60

Scenario 1

0.84

0.7

0.05

0.5

0.8

60

Scenario 2

0.90

0.5

0.05

0.75

0.8

60

Scenario 3

0.75

0.5

0.05

0.5

1.0

60

Scenario 4

1.58

0.7

0.05

0.75

1.0

60

Note: Bold figures indicate parameter deviations from baseline values.
Source: Authors’ own calculations.

The results of the simple simulation show the following:
• In row two we vary only the collection rate, from 50 percent to 70 percent.

The result is that the property tax share of GDP increases from 0.6 percent
to 0.84 percent, or by about one-third.
• In row three we vary only the assessment ratio, from 50 percent to 75 percent. The result is that the property tax share of GDP rises to 0.9, an increase of nearly 50 percent.
• In row four we eliminate exemptions and do not change anything else.
The result is that the property tax share of GDP rises to 0.75, an increase of
about one-fourth.
• In row ﬁve we vary all three of these factors together and more than double
the property tax share of GDP.
In summary, this simple simulation illustrates that quite plausible improvements in government administrative and design practices can move
the property tax to a much more signiﬁcant place in the revenue system of
developing countries. Getting property taxes to rise by 1 percent of GDP
will generally imply a signiﬁcant jump in the ﬁnancing capacity of local governments in many countries around the world. In table 2.9 we perform an
additional simple simulation to illustrate that point. If, for the sample of
countries in our data set (used to run the regressions in tables 2.3 and 2.4),
we ﬁrst select those countries that collect less than 1 percent of GDP in
property taxes and then allow those countries to collect 1 percent of GDP in
property taxes, the average increase in subnational government revenues would
be around one-third.
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TABLE 2.9 Simulations of Revenue Implications of Property Taxes
Representing 1 Percent of GDP in the Year 2000 (21 Countries)

Property tax as a
percent of GDP

Resulting percent increase of
subnational government
revenues when property tax
is equal to 1 percent of GDP

Austria

0.1

4.7

Bulgaria

0.3

9.2

Chile

0.7

13.1

Croatia

0.5

9.2

Czech Republic

0.5

1.4

Estonia

0.5

7.7

Ethiopia

0.2

7.0

Hungary

0.7

2.2

Indonesia

0.1

66.0

Iran

0.2

45.5

Italy

0.9

0.6

Jamaica

0.2

141.9

Lithuania

0.6

6.0

Romania

0.5

11.5

Slovak Republic

0.6

17.8

Slovenia

0.7

3.9

Sri Lanka

0.7

79.9

Swaziland

0.1

130.0

Thailand

0.3

34.5

Uganda

0.1

20.1

Ukraine

0.0

9.2

Mean values

0.4

29.6

Selected
countries
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Source: Authors’ own calculations.
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Of course, we remain aware that even small improvements in some of
these parameters can be hard to produce. What is worse, big efforts are often
put together to improve one or two critical parameters just to see the deterioration of other parameters, thus with little overall impact on actual revenue
collections. For example, Dillinger (1988) reports how the Philippines’ Property Tax Administration Project was successful in producing tax maps and
updated property assessments, but never yielded a substantial increase in revenue because the problem of poor collection practices was never addressed.
Even though valuations increased by 37.5 percent and collectibles by 13.6
percent, actual tax revenues increased by only 1.1 percent. In contrast, as
Kelly (1993) reports, the Indonesian reform was more successful. By focusing
on improved collection efﬁciency and improved valuation and assessment,
property collection efﬁciency rose from 65 to 79 percent, and the share of
property tax revenue in total own source revenue almost doubled between
1990 and 1991.

THE FUTURE OF THE PROPERTY TAX
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Making property taxes work more effectively in developing and transitional
countries is a complex challenge. Although many internal and external factors are involved, we speculate that the future of the property tax in such
countries is mainly dependent on four factors: (1) the pace of decentralization; (2) the efﬁcacy of shortcuts to valuation of property; (3) technology
catch-up; and (4) the willingness of central governments to give local governments access to other productive tax bases.

Factor 1: The Pace of Decentralization
Despite being one of the most talked about development strategies in the past
two decades, decentralization has hardly taken off. Although there are now
many decentralized and decentralizing developing countries, the average expenditure share of subnational governments in total government spending is
considerably less than in developed countries and has barely budged from its
15 percent level in the 1970s. However, more elected ofﬁcials are bringing
pressure, there is a continuing reaction against central governments that have
become too controlling, and there is a political strategy to promote bringing
governments closer to people. All of this could lead to increased decentralization. As decentralizing countries turn to the job of identifying revenue sources
for local governments, an expanded property tax will be an obvious choice.
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Factor 2: The Efficacy of Shortcuts
Administrative cost is arguably the biggest constraint to the growth of the
property tax. It is just too expensive and too hard to properly levy and enforce.
Countries are turning increasingly to “shortcuts” to address this problem.
The introduction of notional valuation based on location and area, selfassessment, indexing between valuation periods, and the exemption of “hard
to tax” properties are all examples of such shortcuts. Will these innovations
save the property tax or destroy it?
The approach that is gaining currency in developing countries appears to
be area-based assessment. This is both inexpensive and simple enough to be
acceptable to taxpayers. However, at base it requires a judgmental assessment
of value per square meter in each of the valuation zones prescribed by the regional or local government. These notional values will require adjustment
each year in order to build elasticity into the property tax. Moreover, the idea
that all properties in a zone can be subjected to the same notional valuation
per area unit may turn out to be an enemy of fairness in property taxation.
Area-based assessments are likely to improve the revenue yield of the tax and
give a better ratio of administrative cost to collections, but local governments
are not likely to move to a higher intensity of property tax use with this approach to valuation.

Factor 3: Technology Catch-Up
Will technology save property tax administration in developing countries? In
general, developing countries appear to be closing the technology gap at a
much faster rate than they are closing the income gap. Can new technologies
such as computerized mass appraisal, satellite-aided mapping, and crossreferencing circumvent the high costs and time delays associated with the valuation process?9 Will it soon be possible for local governments to keep up-to-date
records of land characteristics and ownership? If new technologies in property
tax assessment, collection, and record keeping do catch on, they could minimize much of the current problem with the property tax in developing nations.

Factor 4: The Willingness of Central Governments
Will central governments release other productive revenue sources to local
governments? Examples are the right to tax payrolls, piggyback personal in–1___
0___
+1___

9

Dillinger (1989) describes the successful practice in some Brazilian municipalities of using
data provided by other agencies to ﬂag changes in the tax base.
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come taxes and excises, business taxes, and taxes on the use and ownership of
motor vehicles. To the extent these “easier” tax sources are available to local
governments, the property tax might be minimized as a subnational government revenue source.
In sum, property taxation still has great potential but also great uncertainty as an instrument for bringing revenues and accountability to subnational governments in developing and transitional countries around the
world.
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